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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

2 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, USIB Security Committee

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 11/2

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1. I have noted with interest draft No. 8 of DCID 11/2 which you circulated to CIA operating officials under cover of a memorandum dated 29 July. As you know, [REDACTED] of the DD/I's office is pulling together comments from the DDI area. The purpose of this memorandum is to pass on to you some ideas in my capacity as Chairman, USIB Committee on Documentation.

2. Your Committee has gone a long way in arriving at a draft which meets the demands of the security components of the intelligence community. The present draft fails in certain respects to adequately take into account the operating realities which the research, reference and document control components must cope with in implementing any DCID on this subject.

3. I believe you have reached the point of diminishing returns in trying to do more through your Committee until the views of the Committee on Documentation have been obtained. As you know, CODIB had reservations about the exclusive assignment of this task to your Committee. But I requested that CODIB take no action, and reassured the members that CODIB would be brought into the picture at the appropriate time. That time has in my opinion arrived. From calls we have received, the most probable way of assuring the support of this type of draft in some of the departments is to give the documentalist rather than the security officer a role in its coordination within his agency. This is, after all, more of a procedural matter than one outlining security policy.

4. It is my hope that you would share this view. Our objective is the same: to get a good, workable directive out, and to do it without further delay.

5. I am attaching some notes outlining points for inclusion in a directive. These are designed to make implementation easier without sacrificing security considerations. In the main, we suggest the

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inclusion of basic ground rules and definitions. When these have been agreed on, detailed implementation would be left to derivative agreements which could be modified with experience without disturbing the DCID.

/s/

PAUL A. BOREL

Chairman

USIB Committee on Documentation

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Concepts and Definitions Proposed by  
Chairman, CODIB, for Inclusion  
in a Revised DCID 11/2

Basic Disclosure Concept

Basic to all disclosure and release policies and procedures are the concepts that intelligence and intelligence information will be made available only to those who have appropriate security clearances and who have a need to know.

Effect of Nature of Material Protected

Policies and procedures must be applicable to the wide variety of classified intelligence materials ranging from "raw" information to "finished" intelligence. Precise definitions of these categories are difficult to formulate. It is therefore more realistic to evaluate the type of protection to afford a particular category on the basis of which element or feature most requires safeguarding. In the case of raw information, the source of the information or the means of acquiring it is usually most important. In the case of finished intelligence, it is the attribution of judgments and conclusions to the producer that most requires safeguarding.

Locus of Control

The locus of control is to reside in the primary producing component. For intelligence information, this is the collecting service; for finished

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intelligence, this is the production office. Control of national intelligence rests with the USIB; of interdepartmental intelligence, with the participating departments and agencies acting jointly; of departmental intelligence, with the producing department or agency, unless higher authority has granted exception.

#### Delegation of Control Responsibility

The present day responsibilities and mode of operation of intelligence organizations makes necessary a delegation of authority among themselves to perform certain acts which in times past have been reserved to themselves, and further, to minimize the occasions when recourse to the controlling organization is necessary to obtain the desired approval. Applied to the dissemination and disclosure of information and intelligence, delegation of authority may be evidenced by the presence or absence of control indicators on the documents themselves.

#### Limitations on Disclosure by Third Agencies

Information reports customarily disguise the actual identity of the source and their informational content is not attributable to the collectors themselves. Intelligence reports (research and estimates), on the other hand, invariably identify the producer and are of interest primarily because the judgments reflected in these reports are identified as those of the producer. These and the considerations already mentioned point to separate approaches in applying special control indicators:

Information reports on publication should generally be considered a contribution to the general pool of knowledge

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and no longer within the special control of the originator with reference to the incorporation of their information content into intelligence reports and to their dissemination. Intelligence reports and estimates on publication should continue to be considered as within the control of the originator. Disclosure and further dissemination, directly or indirectly, should not be made without the originator's permission.

#### Categories of Recipients

To facilitate the application of release policies, individuals and organizations entitled to receive classified information and intelligence are categorized as follows:

- Category I U.S. Government employees of the intelligence community, i.e., full-time employees of the intelligence components whose heads are members of the USIB.
- Category II U.S. Government full-time employees of components within the State and Defense areas, but not in USIB components themselves (e.g., Army Signal Corps).
- Category III U.S. Government full-time employees outside the State-Defense area who participate in the intelligence process (e.g., Bureau of Mines working on NIS).

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Category IV U.S. persons and organizations having contractual relationships with USIB member departments and agencies.

Category V Foreign liaison officers and organizations with whom the USIB member departments and agencies have exchange agreements.

Control Indicators

The following control indicators are authorized and their use directed where appropriate:

1. To avoid inappropriate use of information of value to intelligence officers:

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

2. To protect source by limiting dissemination:

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES

AND METHODS INVOLVED

3. To avoid undue risk of compromise by limiting geographical area of distribution:

NO DISSEM ABROAD

4. To avoid unauthorized disclosure by retaining control of further dissemination in the originator:

DISSEM CONTROLLED

Clarification of Terms "Contractor" and "Consultant"

When the control indicator DISSEM CONTROLLED appears on a document, it will, among others, estop its release to intelligence contractors.

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(persons or organizations, including consultants, having contractual relations with an USIB member department or agency for intelligence purposes). This indicator notwithstanding, it is not intended that individual consultants working on the documents to be so marked be denied access to them on the premises of the intelligence organization or while the document remains within its control. For example,

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